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A familiar situation?
• Firms of neighboring superpower scooping up domestic firms
Incoming U.S. FDI: 2/3 of $450B in 2006
• Soaring currency
2003-07: CAD/USD rate up 70%
• Burgeoning budget surplus
2007-08: $14 billion
Familiar to you as well…
• Firms of neighboring superpower scooping up domestic firms
Incoming AUS FDI: 45% of $77B in 2005
• Soaring currency
2003-07: NZD/USD rate up 45%
• Burgeoning budget surplus
2007-08 forecast: $7.4 billion
POLICY RESPONSE
Î Calls for manufacturing support
• Investment incentives: 
Capital Cost Allowance increased to 50% (federal)
Automotive investment strategy (ON): $500m
Advanced manufacturing investment strategy (ON): $650m
• Support for training and innovation:
Canadian Skills & Innovation Project (federal): $1,000m
Next Generation Jobs Fund (ON): $650m
• Aid coping with currency rise: 
Economic Hardship Fund (federal): $1,000m
Quebec: $620m
• Etc.
POLICY RESPONSE
Î Similar calls for manufacturing support
In particular, to spend money and effort attracting FDI: 
• Prof. Michael Porter
• New Zealand Institute
• Boston Consulting Group
• Progressive Party
• WTO
• OECD
POLICY RESPONSE
Î Response
“New Zealand needs to attract more and better quality foreign direct 
investment. […] The above suggests a clear role for government to […] 
attract investment with desirable characteristics through guaranteed access 
to government services and, where necessary, incentives that are closely 
aligned with the generation of spillover benefits.”
Economic Development Minister, Jim Anderton (May 10, 2004)
“We are therefore going to fine tune the inward investment programme. […] 
Specifically, we will discontinue the major grants and loan guarantees 
element of the Strategic Investment Fund. […] The second step, which I am 
announcing today, is a new focus on assisting firms to undertake outward 
investment.”
Economic Development Minister, Trevor Mallard (August 30, 2007)
POLICY RESPONSE
Î Review of Investment New Zealand (INZ)
19 projects attracted over 4 years:   $600m invested
Fraction attributed to INZ:   $155m
Total cost of INZ:   $60m
Externalities needed to break-even:  13% for 3 years
No way
POLICY RESPONSE
Î Local government activism
• World of WearableArts Awards show:   ÆWellington
• V8 Supercar:   Æ Hamilton
• LA Galaxy (David Beckham):   ÆWellington
• Ellerslie International Flower Show:   Æ Christchurch 
DOES IT MAKE SENSE?
If externalities outweigh costs
• On output side – firm cannot appropriate all the benefits
• On input side – distortions in the factor markets
• Main measurement problem: account for opportunity costs
• “Best alternative use for the resources”
• Wellington city council: 20 - to - 1  multiplier
• Ex-post evaluation possible: Greenstone & Moretti (2003)
With competition, advantages need to be unique
• Private advantage (costs or benefits)
• Social advantage (spillovers)
EXTERNALITIES
Take automobile assembly plants as an example
(output side)
• Technologically advanced
Î R&D subsidies
• Generate massive export earnings
Î Exporter support & development grants
• Agglomeration effects (multiplier)
Î Regional development grants
Î Infrastructure grants
EXTERNALITIES
Take automobile assembly plants as an example
(input side)
• Highly skill-intensive 
Î Training grants
• Firm can pay more than going market wage
Î Strategic trade policy 
• Market wage can differ from shadow wage (private cost of working)
Î Minimum wages, regulation 
EXTERNALITIES
• Many common externalities are widely recognized 
and governments already run programs targeting 
them, obviating the need for further action.
• Interventions only warranted to facilitate attraction 
of large projects.
• Call for support will also work in reverse: once a 
government has a reputation to subsidize, firms can 
threaten to leave to extract subsidies.
EXTERNALITIES
Assess welfare benefits using ‘natural experiment’
• Million dollar plants (Greenstone & Moretti, 2003)
• Special issue in Site Selection journal
• One county is the winner – one or two losers
• Identical, except for… (coin-toss?)
• 1.1% – 1.7% jump in local property valuations
• Asset: PDV of future profit stream, incorporates all 
relevant costs (subsidies, opportunity costs)
• 1.5% jump in wage earnings in plant’s industry in winning 
county
COMPETITION
Jurisdictions compete with incentive packages
• Tax breaks
• Training subsidy
• Land grant
• Infrastructure provision
• Promotional/marketing support
• Million dollar plant conclusion
Î Contrary to expectations, some net local welfare gains 
materialized
COMPETITION
Nash equilibrium
• To predict outcome of bidding game, we turn to game theory.
• Local governments will bid on their best response function
• (similar to Bertrand-price or Cournot-quantity competition in 
industrial organization)
• Two hypothetical examples
• New Zealand competes with Australia to attract movie shoot
• Figure 1: PBNZ > PBAU and SBNZ > SBAU (A > 0 and B > 0)
• Figure 2: PBNZ > PBAU and SBNZ < SBAU      (A > 0 and B < 0)
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Figure 1: An illustration of the optimal subsidies offered
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Figure 2: Optimal subsidies when Australian externalities dominate
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COMPETITION
Main finding
• Even if externalities are positive, competition will lead to some 
of them being transferred to the firm
• Optimal bid is positive and proportional to size of total externalities
• Net welfare accruing locally is the fraction of externalities that is 
unique (private cost advantage or location-specific spillovers)
• Only the difference between the total value of the project (intrinsic 
private plus social/externalities) in the winning versus the runner-
up location.
Assess local initiatives
• V8 Supercar (Hamilton)
• Mayor Michael Redman: “there is no reason to believe the return 
for Hamilton would be any less than the amount forecasted in 
the Wellington economic impact assessment.”
• LA Galaxy (Wellington)
• Spillovers to future soccer games are a likely unique externality 
• World of WearableArts Awards show (Wellington)
• Better fit: More international appeal / fashion
• Ellerslie International Flower Show (Christchurch)
• Fit may be better (SB↑), but costs higher / sales lower (PB↓)
• Risk of overbidding greatest
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
1. Competition leads to project locating in highest value location
Î Even if coordination is feasible, not necessarily ideal
2. Jurisdiction can only affect its own strategy 
Î Not bidding is not on best-response function
3. Only a fraction of the externalities are captured locally 
Î Stay out of the bidding game unless you are committed to get 
estimates right (avoid overbidding).
4. Rules-based policies are unlikely to identify “unique” advantages
Î Stay out of the bidding game unless you can tolerate 
discretion (avoid winner’s curse)
INTERESTING CONTRAST
(Both from political economy and industrial 
organization / international trade perspective)
• CANADA:
• Large budget, popular programs
• Effectiveness in doubt
• NEW ZEALAND:
• Small budget, controversial program
• Interesting experiment
Canada
Fund Juris-
diction
Duration Value    
(C$ mil)
Focus
Large Scale Strategic Investment Initiative ON axed 650 Promote R&D, skills training, and infrastructure
Strategic Manufacturing Investment ON indefinite 63/year1 Industry support under general "Investment and Trade Strategy" 
Ontario Automotive Investment Strategy ON 5 years 500 Automotive assembly & Tier 1 suppliers (min. $300m or 300 jobs)
Advanced Manufacturing Investment Strategy ON 5 years 500 Investments in technology & innovation (min. $25m or 100 jobs)
Next Generation Jobs Fund ON 5 years 650 Clean automotive and green technologies (+ three more sectors) 
Agreement with GM QU 5 years 290 Developing a network of automotive suppliers in Quebec
Strategic Investment Support Program QU indefinite 75 Investment support for manufacturing and six other sectors
Regional Economic Intervention Funds QU indefinite 210 (i) direct business support, (ii) regional investment fund, (iii) venture capita
Capital Tax Credit QU 4 years N/A Elimination of tax on capital by 2011 and increased credit until then
Aid package (cope with currency appreciation) QU 5 years 620 Manufacturing: 70% for training and direct assistance, rest in tax measures
Canadian Skills & Innovation Project Fed 5 years 1,000 Investment support for automotive (half of the fund) and aerospace
Capital Cost Allowance rate increased to 50% Fed 3 years N/A Investment incentive for manufacturing and processing machinery & equip
Economic hardship fund Fed 1 year 1,000 Aid single-(traditional) industry towns suffering from volatile markets
Table 3: Most important recent subsidy and incentive programs for manufacturing investments in Canada
New Zealand
Offshore investment partnerships
• Achieving a global presence, not by selling out to a foreign firm with the 
right external presence and scale, but retain NZ ownership for the 
prosperity of local communities.
– NZ Venture Investment Fund ($344m / 37 firms over last 5 years) 
• Offshore location (marketing, processing,…) requires outward 
investment if the firm is to retain control of that part of its operations
– Change international tax rules: tax exemption for active income 
earned by New Zealand companies offshore
– Tax funded support for outward investment if it could:
• introduce new technology, R&D activity, ability to commercialise innov.
• establish new or enhanced linkages & networks to benefit other NZ firms
• improve position of other NZ firms in international supply chains, 
distribution networks and markets
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